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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF NEWSPAPERMEN,
AUTHORS, AND OTHERS IN THE OPINION FIELD - ITS
LEGALITY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
NAN ETT DEmBrrz*

"Not for many generations, if ever before in our history, has any
organ of government claimed the power to examine and to pass
judgment upon who shall work on newspapers." This was the reaction of an outstanding commentator to the recent investigation
of New York newspapermen, centering mainly on the personnel of
the New York Times, by the so-called Eastland Committee of the
Senate.'The Eastland Committee was continuing the pattern of attempted purification of public opinion media by means of Congressional investigation, which has become increasingly manifest over
the last decade.
Stafring with the movies, dealing intermittently with radio and
the clergy,2 and climaxing with the newspapers, the investigating
committees have assumed it was proper for Congress to investigate
anyone whose- work gave him an influence on public opinion and
who was charged with Communist associations or sympathies. They
did not seem concerned with a basic question posed in this article:
does the first amendment require a showing that a medium of communication or a profession (e.g., the press, radio, or clergy) is being
used to a substantial degree for dissemination of pro-Communist
propaganda, before a Congressional investigation of suspected Communist sympathy can be undertaken against individuals in that
*Member of New York Bar; B.A., Michigan, 1932; LL.B., Columbia
1937; LL.M., Columbia, 1946. Formerly attorney in Alien Enemy Controi
Unit of Department of Justice; counsel to New York Civil Liberties Union,

New York affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union. The views here

expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the Union.
1. Walter Lippman, Today and Tomorrow, column entitled Congress
and the Press, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 10, 1956, § 1, p. 22, col. 3. The
"investigation was conducted by the subcommittee on Internal Security, headed
by Senator James 0. Eastland, of the Senate judiciary Committee. The hear-

ing appears as Part 17 of the Hearings of the subcommittee, pursuant to
S. Res. 58, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., Strategy and Tactics of World Communism
(Communist,_ Activity in New York) Jan. 4-6, 1956.

2. See Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities cs.
I-V (1952).
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medium or profession ?3 Thus, the committee investigating the
clergy was in no way deterred by its own conviction that pro-Communist clergymen were only a handful compared to the large body
of "loyal" clergymen. 4 Similarly, the Eastland Committee obviously
assumed it had power to investigate and expose any and every proCommunist in the non-Communist press. The Committee did not
even purport to answer the question of whether the newspapermen
under investigation have a substantial influence on public opinion
now or even whether they had such an influence in the 1940's when
their Communist affiliations for the most part purportedly occurred,
or even whether the work and writings of the accused individuals
had in any way been affected by their alleged association5
Until and even through the newspaper investigation," many of
those concerned with civil liberties acquiesced in the congressional
assumption of power of surveillance over the media of expression.
Thus, though there was a storm of protest about some of the procedures in the investigation of clergymen,1 even a clergyman known
for his interest in civil liberties objected only to the Com3. By "Communist" the writer will refer to a member of the Com.munist Party in accordance with its membership requirements, and by
"pro-Communist" will refer to one who is not a member but whose views
or expressions are dictated by a dedication to an expansion of Russian power
or the Communist form of government.
4. See, e.g., House Committee on Un-American Activities, Annual Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities for 1953, H.R. Rep.
No. 1192, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 97 (1954) : "The official record establishes that,
as in other fields, the few members of the clergy who have associated with
Communist causes is a minute percentage of the hundreds of thousands of
loyal, patriotic men of the cloth." Nevertheless, the committee thereafter
investigated Rev. John A. Hutchinson, Professor of Religion at Williams
College, who, according to "secret sworn testimony" by an unidentified informant, allegedly had in the 1930's "'reported to Communist party headquarters'" before going to his church. The charge was emphatically denied
by Rev. Hutchinson. N. Y. Times, March 19, 1954, p. 10, col. 4.
5. See notes 117-21 infra and texts thereto for a discussion of Eastland
Committee hearings.
6. The newspaper investigation was unique in that it aroused substantial editorial opposition not only on the ground that it seemed intended
to discredit the New York Times (see editorial: The Voice of a Free Press.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1956, p. 32, col. 1), but also on the ground that the
committee's power to investigate the newsmen was, under the circumstances,
of doubtful constitutionality. See The Post and Times-Herald (Washington,
D. C.) : "the responsibility for weeding them out belongs, in the American
system, to publishers and editors, not to Congress"; The Star (Kansas City) :
"The basic investigating power must be kept under rigid control or it becomes in itself the present danger to our American way of life"; The PostGazette (Pittsburgh, Pa.) : "In the absence of such evidence [that newspapers are being used to subvert the Government] it appears that the subcommittee is engaged in a fishing expedition. . .

."

Editorials reprinted in

N. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1956, p. 8; Jan. 8, 1956, p. 70.
7. E.g., see the protests against release of testimony that Rabbis Stephen
Wise and Judah Magnes had, prior to 1924, followed the Communist Party
Line. N. Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 2, col. 6.
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mittee's inaccuracies, and conceded that its exposure of any clergymen who were in fact pro-Communist would not be objectionable.8
Apparently because it is so common for non-Communist liberals
to try to spot pro-Communists in order to keep them from positions
of influence in liberal organizations,0 Congress' performing this
function seems unexceptionable to many of them.
But democracy means preservation of a line between the spheres
of private 'and governmental action, and a refusal to make easy
transitions from one to the other. For purposes of constitutional
doctrine, precedent for extensions of state control, and most important, effect on free expression, there is a vital difference between
a private group, of clergymen let us say, attempting to eliminate.
Communist influence from its own counsels, and the Government,
through a congressi6nal committee, investigating alleged Communists in the clergy. While a private organization's stand and manner
of dealing with alleged pro-Communists is a relatively parochial
matter, the congressional investigations have a force and influence
stemming from the control and authority of the Government over
the people as a whole. When the investigations concern charges of
Communism against journalists, authors, or others in the opinion
field, they undermine, the author believes and will try to demonstrate in" this article, the whole institution of free exchange of
opinion in this country, and the enjoyment of free expression built
on the first amendment. Indeed, because of the unique relation between investigations in the opinion field and first amendment rights,
we suggest that this type of investigation bears particular responsibility for a fear of expression which, according to even our more
conservative observers, has been laying a heavy and deadening hand
on the free exchange of ideas."
8. See testimony of Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam in Hearings of Com-

mittee of Un-American Activities of House of Representative, July 21, 1953,
printed in U. S. News and World Report, Aug. 7, 1953, pp. 40-48, 100-42,
especially at p. 135: "... if the procedures are carefully scrutinized... all
of that [the Committee's informing church organizations of Communists
among their leaders] could be handled very easily."
9. See, e.g., 1940 resolution of American Civil Liberties Union, barring
from any official position anyone subject to Communist discipline. Annual Report of American Civil 'Liberties Union for 1939-1940 at 48-49 (1940).
10. See, for examples of this observation from diverse sources, letter

from former United States diplomatic officials, stating "Fear is playing an
important part in American life." N. Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1954, § IV, p. 8E,
col 6; Secretary of State Dulles' reference to the authors of the letter as "a
distinguished group of former diplomats whom I highly respect." N. Y.
Times, Jan. 20, 1954, p. 9, col. 2. See also President Eisenhower's speech at
Dartmouth College against "book-burning," N. Y. Times, June 15, 1953,
p. 1, col 6. See article entitled, To Insire the End of Our Hysteria, by Paul
G. Hoffman, Chairman of the Board of Studebaker-Packard Corporation,
describing "The complex of fear that has spread over America.. ." in respect
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After discussing the impact on first amendment rights of congressional investigation of alleged Communists in the opinion field,
consideration will be accorded to the circumstances in which such
an investigation would nevertheless be constitutionally justified. In
this connection, we shall give due regard to the fact that pro-Communists in opinion work may deliberately try to mislead public
opinion on political questions. On the constitutional question, we
shall also consider the case pending before the United States Supreme Court involving the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the Communist Party to register with the
Attorney General as a Communist-action organization.loa This order,
like the congressional investigations, is an effort at public exposure
of the identity of Communists, particularly in relation to their
propaganda activities. We shall also consider the contempt of Congress indictment now pending against author Harvey O'Connor,
which offers the most imminent possibility 1 of upper court consideration of the first amendment in connection with investigations
in the opinion field, and we shall thereafter give attention to the
"informing" function of Congress, on which the investigations have
been partly predicated.
to freedom of thought and expression, N. Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 14, 1954,
p. 9. See also Oakes, This Is the Real, the Lasting Damage, N. Y. Times
Magazine, March 7, 1954, p. 9. For a sidelight on the issue, see letter from
"High School Teacher" in the strongly anti-Communist New Leader, April
20, 1953, p. 28, complaining that the fear of political expression instilled in the
students by other teachers makes it impossible for her to continue to tell them
that talk of repression is only Communist propaganda.
10a. Since this article went to press, the case has been decided on nonconstitutional grounds in a 6 to 3 opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 24 U. S. L. Week 4224 (U.S. April 30, 1956). The Court held that the
Board must either grant the Party's motion to adduce newly discovered evidence of perjury on the part of three witnesses against it at the Board hearing,
or must expunge their testimony from the record, and reconsider its determination "in the light of the record as freed from the challenge that now beclouds it." However, the Court noted that the case raised "constitutional questions appropriate for this Court's consideration," and the issues hereinafter
discussed will undoubtedly be again presented to the Court after the next
stage of the proceedings.
11. A similar indictment against author Corliss Lamont was dismissed by the district court on non-constitutional grounds, and an appeal is
now pending from this dismissal. United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955), appeal docketed, C145-216 (2d Cir.). Thus, the merits will not,
at best, be reached in the Lamont case for some time. Contempt citations have
been issued against several newspapermen who refused to answer on grounds
of the first amendment in the Eastland investigation, but the eases have not
yet been presented to the grand jury. As to these refusals, see N. Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1956, p. 6, col. 1; p. 7, col. 3; as to contempt citations, see N. Y. Times,
May 11, 1956, p. 10, col. 7. The perjury indictments against Owen Lattimore,
writer, lecturer, and teacher on Far Eastern problems, which involved the first
amendment, have been dismissed, and the prosecution definitely dropped. See
note 31, infra.
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Despite the number of times witnesses have raised the first
amendment in their objections to testifying before congressional
committees investigating various phases of Communism, the Supreme Court has never considered the question of the constitutionality of any of these investigations under the amendment. In the
beginning of the intensive Communist investigatory period, 1947 to
1950, various courts of appeals upheld the investigations under the
first amendment, including that of alleged Communist influence in
the movies in the so-called "Hollywood Ten" case; the Supreme
Court uniformly denied certiorari."2 For a considerable period
after these decisions-until O'Connor and a few others sought another first amendment test at the risk of a contempt convictionthose objecting to con'gressional interrogation relied on the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, which the Supreme Court has vigorously protected throughout the past decade."
When an objector put his objection on the grounds of both the first
and fifth amendments, the usual result was that the objection under
the fifth was upheld, so the objection under the first -was merely
hortatory.14 Finally, in the Einspak case where both amendments
had been invoked but it seemed the Supreme Court was bound to
decide on first amendment grounds, 5 the Supreme Court nevertheless reversed Emspak's contempt conviction merely by upholding
his claim 6f the fifth amendment privilege.10
Thus, the most authoritative decisions to date on the first
amendment validity of the congressional investigation of suspected
Communists in opinion-influencing positions are the early courts of
appeals' rulings, reinforced to some extent in 1954 by the Court of
12. Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U. S. 934 (1950) ; Marshall v. United States, 176 F. 2d 473 (D.C. Cir.
1949),cert. denied, 339 U. S. 933 (1950) ; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.
2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334,U. S. 843 (1948) ; Josephson v. United
States, 165 F. 2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 338 (1948). See
Morford v. United States, 176 F. 2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), reersed on procedural grounds, 339 U. S.258 (1950).
13. See Brunner v. United States, 343 U. S.918 (1952), reersing 190
F. 2d 167 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Blau v. United States, 340 U. S.159 (1950).
14. See e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 193, n. 5 (1955)
(hearing conducted by House Un-American Activities Committee) ; N. Y.
Times, Sept 16, 1955, p. 14, col. 4 (hearing conducted by Senate Internal
Security subcommittee).
15. The claim of privilege against self-incrimination had been rejected
by the court below, United States v. Emspak, 203 F. 2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
And it appeared from the language of the grant of certiorari that the Supreme Court would consider the validity of the investigation under the first
amendment. Emspak v. United, 346 U. S.809 (1953).
16. Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 (1955); decided Xith
companion case, Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S.155 (1955).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia in the Lattimore case." We
will suggest, however, the possibility that a fuller exploration by the
courts of the first amendment question, particularly in the light of
the Rumety decisions of the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court,'" might lead to a departure from these rulings. But whether
or not the courts confront and satisfactorily appraise the first
amendment question in the pending round of cases, a question
mark rather than a period will be the appropriate punctuation on the
subject of this article. For it is apparent from the recent newspaper
hearings, which the chairman has said will be resumed, 19 and
scheduled hearings on a report issued by The Fund for the Republic
of the Ford Foundation, 20 that, regardless of changes in the party
affiliation of committee chairmen, the problem of delimiting the
congressional power to investigate in the opinion field will be a
recurrent one.
I. How INVESTIGATIONS IN THE OPINION FIELD OPERATE
Preventing Exposure to Pro-Communist Views
It has been a popular theory for some years now that an effective and democratic method of handling propaganda by extremists
of the right or left is to expose the identity of its authors. 2' In
theory, this exposure is not suppressive, but merely enlightening,
enabling the reader or auditor to appraise the writer or speaker's
statements with the latter's bias in mind. The theory, however,
wherever else it may apply, cannot stand up when the exposure is
17.
18.

See United States v. Lattimore, 215 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345

U. S. 41 (1953).

19. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
20. Chairman Walter of the House Un-American Activities Committee
plans to call Dr. Robert M. Hutchins, director of the Fund for the Republic.
"We're not going into the Fund for the Republic-we're going into Dr.
Hutchins," Rep. Walter said in an interview. He said the committee wants
to know how a certain passage which he said corresponded to "Communist
party line" got into the 1954 report of the fund. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan.
12, 1956, § 1, p. 6, col. 4.
21. See Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To
Secure These Rights, 164 (1947) ; Smith, Democratic Control of Propaganda
Through Registration and Disclosure, 6 Pub. Opin. Quart. 27 (1942),
Institute of Living Law, Combating TotalitarianPropaganda: The Method
of Suppression, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 193, 213 (1942) ; Nutting, Freedoin of Silence:
Constitutional Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political
Affairs, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 181, 204-13 (1948) ; cf. Ernst and Katz, Speech:
Public and Private, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 620, 626 (1943). See also Viereck v.
United States, 318 U. S. 236, 251 (1943) (dissenting opinion) ; Josephson v.
United States, 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 838
(1948).
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by means of congressional investigations. In real life, the investigating committees seeking to identify and expose pro-Communists
in the opinion field22 do not merely offer enlightening biographical data, but instead teach that suspected Communists must not be
given an audience.
How can the committees be otherwise understood when they
make clear that suspected pro-Communists should be discharged
from jobs and removed from opportunities where they can disseminate their views, and in fact that suspicion will attach to anyone who tolerafes them in opinion-influencing positions?- Indeed,
the raison d'etre of the attempted congressional exposure of
suspected Communists in the opinion field forecloses a moderate,
academic, "mere-enlightenment" approach or reaction to the exposure. The congressional exposures are in an atmosphere of
crisis and emergency; exposure of Communists is sought on the
ground of the grave risk that the public has been and will be duped
and misled into disloyalty and treason by the suspected Com22. "Informing" the American public and exposing to it the identity of
suspected Communists, is not merely an incidental by-product of the investigations, but is one of their major aims. See statement of Chairman Velde
of House Un-American Activities Committee during the hearings on Bishop
Oxnam, cited supra note 8, at 107, that his intention was to ". . get your
record straight so that we may inform the American people regarding their
activities, what you did belong to and what you did not belong to." See statement of Ex-Congressman Mundt that the committee was to act by exposure
and publicity (92 Cong. Rec. 3767 (1946)), and frequently furnished information to the American people. Carr, op. cit. supranote 2, at 37-38, 56-57,
75, 215, 269, 452, 454. And see Internal Security Subcommittee of Committee
on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, S. Rep. No. 2050, 82d Cong.
2d Sess., 85 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as McCarran Report) ; see testimony during recent hearing before same subcommittee (now headed by
Senator Eastland, and herein called the Eastland committee) as to repetition
in public hearing of names of ex-Communists already disclosed in executive
session, N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1956, p. 20, col. 3; Jan. 7, 1956, p. 6, cols. 5 & 6.
23. E.g., statements by House Un-American Activities Committee as to
the necessity for discharge of Communist scriptwriters and others from the
movie industry, quoted in Carr, op. cit. upra note 2, at 57, 453; questioning
of Bishop Oxuam on his toleration of a clergyman suspected of pro-Communism in a church organization, Hearings cited supra note 8. See Edgerton,
J., dissenting, in Barsky v. United States 167 F. 2d 241, 260 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 334, U. S. 843 (1948) ; Clark, J., dissenting in Josephson v. United
States, 165 F. 2d 82, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 838 (1948).
The mere threat of Committee exposure caused the refusal of the New
York City Board of Estimate to approve a contract with playwright Arthur
Miller; it was "disturbed over rumors that Mr. Miller wvas to be called
-before a Congressional investigating committee because of alleged left-wing
views... :'N. Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 33, col. 4. The contract uras for
Mr. Miller to write a movie script on juvenile delinquency in cooperation with
the New York City Youth Board; the cancellation because of the threatened
exposure seemed particularly inappropriate since the Board had approved
Miller's story outline, had specified that all its "standards and ethics" were to
be observed, and it had "final say on the shooting script .. .." Ibid.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:517

munists' views. 24 Certainly it would be a normal conclusion that

the best course for protection against so insidious a danger would
be to avoid contact with it. There is an easy transition from the
premise that pro-Communists must be exposed, to the premise that
25
no one should be exposed to their opinions.
Condemning Opinion Coinciding with Communist Party "Line"
The committees' emphasis on uncovering and eliminating from
the public forum, writers and others in the opinion field who are
pro-Communists, does not merely impel the public to shun the
individuals it has so categorized. Committees attacking pro-Communism in the opinion field engage in an interrelated condemnation of people and ideas. The ideas embraced in the Communist
Party "line" are necessarily of concern to these committees, and
it is because the "line" encompasses many of the debatable political
issues of the day that the investigations of alleged Communists in
opinion-influencing positions have a pervasive influence on free
expression. The Communist Party does not take a line that is
distinctively Communist on most political issues. Many of its positions on the issues of the day could be reached by an exercise
of honest independent judgment from non-Communist premises.
Thus, currently, the Communist Party line is against NATO, for
recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, for a ban on the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, and for neutralization of Germany. Views on such political issues of general concern are
necessarily the focus in investigations of alleged Communists in
opinion-influencing positions, for it is on these issues rather than
on the unmarketable doctrine of forcible overthrow of the government that the Communist Party addresses the public. 2 0 That is,
24. The subcommittee that submitted the McCarran Report, supra note
22, hereinafter referred to as the McCarran Committee, had as one of its

express objectives the determination of "whether or to what extent these
agents [agents of the Communist world conspiracy] and their dupes led or
misled American Public Opinion." McCarren Report at 2. See Annual Report of House Un-American Activities Committee for 1946, quoted in Carr,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 328; H. Rep. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3, 24 (1940).

25. See e.g., McCarran Report at 170, where the Committee asperses as
one of the Institute for Pacific Relation's "pro-Soviet propaganda activities,"
its idea in 1936 and 1944 "of having outstanding Soviet Spokesmen meet in-

fluential Americans," even though the Communist viewpoint was being represented by open and avowed spokesmen for it.
26. The Senate Committee which recommended passage of the Subversive Activities Control Act, discussed in notes 60-68 infra, and texts thereto

pointed out in justification of the Act's purpose of exposing Communists that
"the present line of the party . . . is to avoid wherever possible the open

advocacy of force and violence." S. Rep. No. 1358, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950) ; see also Senator Eastland's statement in opening the resumed hearings of the Eastland committee that the committee was mindful of the fact
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if a clergyman or publicist is alleged to be a Communist and to
have been aiding Communism, the investigators are necessarily
concerned with whether he propagandized for party line positions;
this, it cannot be doubted, would be a likely function for a Communist in an opinion-influencing position.
How can the committee treat dissemination of the political
views embraced in the "line" as evidence of disloyalty and as a
dangerous influence towards pro-Communism, without indicating
condemnation of such views? It is impossible for it to avoid explicit or implicit condemnation, nor can it carry on the investigation without manifesting that an orthodox affirmative anti-Communist line is the touchstone and badge of loyalty. Thus, for example,
the McCarran Committee in its investigation of pro-Communist
influence on American public opinion as to the Far East, uses as
the yardstick for measuring whether a viewpoint was pro-communist, the assumption that the United States should have unconditionally supported the Nationalist government of China over the
past decade.2 A laudatory description by Owen'Lattimore, journalist and author, in 1945 of economic reforms in the Communist area
during the Chinese Civil War,28 and his belief in 1949 that "Chinese
Titoism" might result if the Russians overrode Chinese interests,"
are taken as evidence of pro-Communist sympathy on Lattimore's
part. Similarly, a recommendation against unconditional American
aid to the Nationalist government is aspersed as pro-Communist in
motivation by showing its parallel in views of the Communist
Party-so
"that the internal Communist conspiracy has as one of its primary aims the
influencing of public opinion...." Hearings, stspra note 1, at p. 1587. See
similar statement by Senator Welker, at opening of a hearing by Eastland
Committee at which it questioned a woman who publishes the "Far East

Reporter" (a pamphlet with a circulation of about 1,000) and who delivers
about 150 lectures a year on the Far East. He stated as the reason for the
hearing that the committee has evidence of "... an effort to attune our foreign
policy to the purposes of the Soviet Foreign Office." N. Y. Herald Tribune.
March 9, 1956, § 1, p. 5, col. 3; N. Y. Times, March 9, 1956, p. 26, col. 6. And
see statement by Chairman Walter, of House Un-American Activities Committee, supra note 20.
27. See McCarran Report at 211.
28. McCarran Report at 192; see Lattimore, Solution in Asia, 79-84,

178-200 (1945).
29. McCarran Report at 211, 210. See also p. 129, as to suspicion of

John Carter Vincent for a similar belief.

30. McCarran Report at 198-200. Similarly, under the caption: 'Lattimore Was . . . A Conscious, Articulate Instrument of the Soviet Conspiracy" (McCarran Report at 214), the Report cites as supporting data

Lattimore's 1945 book, Solution in Asia, which primarily favored continuance
of Chiang Kai Shek's leadership, China's freedom from colonialism, and cooperative economic activity in China by Russia, China, -die United States
and Britain' (Solution in Asia, 79-84, 178-200). The book, the Committee

MINNESOTA LAW'REVIEW

[Vol. 40:517

We are not here concerned with whether the Committee was
right or wrong in its conclusion about Lattimore, or with whether
its evidence of association in addition to the evidence of the coincidence of some of his opinions with the Communist line was of
any probative value. 3' We are concerned only with the tendency
of a committee investigating alleged Communists in the opinion
field to force a government-directed orthodoxy of opinion on what
are in fact controversial issues, such as the proper solution of the
Chinese situation.32 If a committee is to determine whether a
writer other than an overt Communist has a pro-Communist influence on such issues, it is views that bear some similarity to the
party line but could well be voiced by a non-Communist that must
. . was approved as a party line book . . . by the Communist
Party" and sold in Party bookstores (McCarran Report at 217).
Attacks on colonialism and on the Japanese Emperor, and the view
that Outer Mongolia was independent prior to World War II, are also
treated as likely to reflect a pro-Communist purpose (McCarran Report at

pointed out, ".

194, 216).
31. That government officials themselves realized the untrustworthy
calibre of the evidence other than his opinions, is indicated by the fact that
no evidence of affiliation or any type of association with the Party was used
as the basis for his perjury indictment for stating that he "had never been
a follower of the Communist line ... or ever had been a promoter of Colnmunist interests." In the, second indictment, which was filed after the first
was dismissed for vagueness, all the specifications related to Lattimore's
statements of opinion on China and other world problems like those which
figured in his investigation, with the addition of specifications concerning his
publication of similar opinions by others in magazines he edited. After the
second indictment was also held invalid, the Government decided to cease its
attempt to prosecute and did not petition for certiorari. See United States
v. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405 (D. D.C. 1955) (dismissing second indictment and giving history of case), aft'd by an equally divided court (D.C. Cir.
1955). As to conclusion of the case, see N. Y. Times, June 29, 1955, p. 1, col. 3.
32. Thus, for example, Lattimore's view that there were economic improvements in the Communist areas in the Chinese Civil War, which the committee treated as obviously untenable and an indication of pro-Communism,
supra, note 28, in fact had much reputable support. See Report of Military
Intelligence Division of United States War Department on "The Chinese
Communist Movement," date 5 July 1945, printed as Part 7A, Appendix II of
Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 2d Sess. 2415-18, 2395 (1952) ;
Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism 344 (1951) (prepared under a Carnegie grant to Russian Research
Center of Harvard University) ; Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East 227
(1948), as to the "wealth of incontrovertible evidence pointing to widespread
corruption, inefficiency, misery, and political degredation in Kuomintang
China," though his book as a whole attacks Russian and Communist policy;
and see statements of Ambassadors Gauss and Stuart and General Wed emeyer, United States Relations with China 64, 237, 246-47, 257 (U. S. State
Dept., 1949).
Similar documentation as to the non-Communist support for various
opinions held against Lattimore in the investigation and subsequent indictment, are given in the Appellee's Brief in the Court of Appeals in the appeal
on the second indictment. Brief for Appellee, pp. 9-26, United States v. Lattimore, Case No. 12, 609 (D.C. Cir.).
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come in for condemnation-for a concealed Communist dresses
up his views so they are not blatantly and identifiably the fruit of
Communist sympathy. The shadings and complexities of the
opinions, under attack as pro-Communist are therefore necessarily
ignored, and the committee must pass over without comment their
possible elements of truth and merit. Views are dogmatically classifled against the crude yardstick of whether they would have been
agreeable to the Communists. A position that can be epitomized as
having the same thrust as a party view is treated as evidence that
a party view was deliberately followed. Condemning dissemination
of certain views, the committee indicates that one side of the argument, on an issue over which there can be an honest difference of
opinion, is true and approved, and the other not only unenlightening
but cause for suspicion of disloyalty,
Whether or not the committee explicitly goes through the
brocess of appraising opinion on'a series of political issues, as did
the McCarran Committee-which was unusually articulate about
its ratiocinations--the public would, we believe, feel the pressure
toward an "orthodox, uiltra-nationalist point of view. 'Any committee in this field makes clear that pro-Communist opinion is
dangerous, whether or not it tries to go down the line specifying
what that opinion is. But, though pro-Communism ma, rhetorically be termed a virus,33 spotting it is not as simple as sliotting the
measles. It is often uncertain who or what is pro-Communist 3 besides, the commriittees have nurtured' a fear of sutle deception
and its enormous dangers. Divergence from what is obviously
orthodox on any political issue might entail contact with and
absorption of a view coinciding with the Communists; if there is
fear of this consequence, one can only entertain ideas within the
33. E.g., remarks of former Representative Hobbs, in debate on deportatioi statute, 84 Cong. Rec. 10449 (1939).
34. Thus, an Army pamphlet "for the guidance of intelligence officers
and employees," entitled, "How' to- Spot a Communist," stated that one sign
was discussion of "controversial 'subjects" listed as follows: "'McCarthyism,'
violation of civil rights, racial or religious dicrimination, immigration laws,
anti-subversive legislation, any legislation concerning labor unions, the miiitar y budget, and 'peace." The pamphlet was withdrawn after protests by the
American Civil Liberties Union and other organizations. N. Y. Times,
Juje -19,-1955, § 4, p. 2E, col. 5.
See statement of Jackson, J., concurring in part in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 439, n. 11 (1950): "Nothing is more
pernicious than the idea that every radical measure is 'Communistic or every
liberal-minded- person a 'Communist.' One of the tragedies of our time is
,the confusion between reform and Communism-a confusion to which both
the friends mid enemies of reform have contributed. ..
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narrow approved orbit."' The tendency of investigations in this
field as presently conducted is, therefore, we submit, to guide the
public towards an orthodoxy of ultra-nationalism, and to cause
avoidance of any speaker or writer who does not demonstrate by
his avowal of such a viewpoint that he is free from taint or

suspicion.?
It is true that political views resembling those espoused by the
Communist Party line may be brought in as evidence of a person's pro-Communism in investigations in any field, and thus
are stamped with an aura of suspicion. However, treatment of
such views as suspicious and dangerous is more pronounced and
is inevitable, rather than incidental, in investigations in tile opinion
field, because there the dissemination of opinion is the very activity
that is apprehended as the danger.

II. How INVESTIGATIONS IN OPINION FIELD CONTRAVENE
FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
The committees obviously exert an influence against the free
and unabashed scrutiny of ideas envisaged by the first amendment,
insofar as they discourage appraisal of political ideas on their
merits and encourage acceptance of what appears governmentapproved and safe.37
More than that, the very premise on which rests first amendment-free exchange of opinion is defeated by the committees' allpervasive concept and precept that it is dangerous to give Communists an audience for fear they will mislead the public. For the
committees' premise is that all pro-Communist publicists, though
a small minority and of insignificant influence among the hundreds
or thousands of "loyal" persons working in the medium, should be
35. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 255 (D.C. Cir.) ccrt.
denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948) (Edgerton, J., dissenting) : "It is not prudent to
hold views or to join groups that the Committee [the House Un-American
Activities Committee] has condemned. People have grown wary of expressing any unorthodox opinions. No one can measure the inroad the Committee has made in the American sense of freedom to speak .

.

. I think ...

that, among the more articulate, it affects in one degree or another all but the
very courageous, the very orthodox, and the very secure ... "
36. The Committees' work seems analogous to the establishment of
a system of censorship which has the "pervasive" effect of discouraging
any composition that is not certain of the censor's approval. See Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 98 (1940).
37. "A free man ... must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral
majority may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think
wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at all.
Our Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ideological freedom to
. . . preserve our democracy from that subversiveness, timidity and herd-
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silenced. 38 The committees' approach is thus directly opposed to
" .. the theory of our Constitution... that the best test of truth
is the power of the'thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market,"39 and that truth can and will be sifted, from error by
the "power of reason as applied through public discussion ....,0
The committees express none of the confidence in "free and-fearless
reasoning '" 41 that produced the first amendment when they conclude
that the public's protection lies in eliminating all misleading influences-all pro-Communists. Rather than confidence that the power
of reason will find the truth in a free exchange of opinion, the committees seem to follow the view that exposure of the public to the
errors of Communism is fatal to discovery of the truth. The committees thus stand athwart the first amendment way to understand42
"ing and enlightenment.
The committees investigating alleged Communists
in the opinion
fieldmake a further assault on the foundations of free exchange of
opinion, in that they contradict the philosophy expressed in Chief
Justice Hughes' classic declaration in the De Jonge case:
"The question, if the rights of free speech and peacable assembly

are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the
meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of
mindedness of the masses which would foster a tyranny of mediocrity...
The idea that a Constitution should protect individual nonconformity is
essentially American...." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
382, 442-43 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part). ". . . [T]he basis of
the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest
governmental policies." Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 503 (1951).
38. See notes 4, 23-25 supraand texts thereto. See also note 58 infra, and
note 26 supra. No suspected Communist in the opinion field is too insignificant,
apparently, for committee attention.
dissenting).
1
39. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 690 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
40. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41. Ibid. "Justices Holmes and Brandeis . .. thought that the greater
danger to a democracy lies in the suppression of public discussion . .. that,
under the First Amendment, the public has a right to every man's view..."
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 395 (1950)
(Opinion of the Court by Vinson,
C. J.).
42. See Terminiello v.'Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1949); "Speech
. . . may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects. ... There is no room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas
either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups."
And see Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 550 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring): "'The interest, which 'the [First Amendment] guards, and
which gives it its importance, presuppose that there are no orthodoxiesreligious, politicial, economic or scientific-which are immune from debate
and dispute....' International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor
Board, 181 F. 2d 34, 40."
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the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds
of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. '43
Under the De Jonge philosophy, the focus must be on the character of the idea, rather than the speaker; on what is said rather
than who says it. The De Jonge principle means that anything can
be said and anything can be heard, up to the point where the statements in themselves, judged by their content, create a danger in the
constitutional sense. The committees work toward the opposite pole
from De Jonge: they cull over speakers and writers, attempting to
eliminate those of a particular type-pro-Communist-from the public forum.
The interrelated condemnation of ideas and persons in congressional investigations of alleged pro-Communist authors, clergymen, or others in the opinion field, demonstrates the prescience and
importance of the De Jonge doctrine. The investigations proceed
from the premise, contrary to De Jonge, that the character of
authors rather than the content and merit of their expressions is
primary. Then, though theoretically directed only at ascertaining
the motivation of certain publicists, the investigations result in
government designation of what political opinions are permissible
or impermissible. The Government thus usurps by indirection a
power it could not assume directly, for, to quote Mr. Justice Jackson's succinct statement of democratic faith: "It is not the function
'44
of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error.
Many elements conduce to secure popular acceptance of the
committees' ideological leadership and standards. Among these elements are the people's tendency to accept a proffer of authoritarian
guidance in an age of confusion, anxiety and fear for national
safety, the committees' appeals to patriotism and to personal pride
in not being duped, and the threat of being suspected of pro-Communism with social and economic detriment in consequence. All
contribute to the committees' power to influence the public away
from belief and interest in a free flow of thought and expression.
43. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937). The holding was
that De Jonge could not constitutionally be held guilty of a crime, merely
because he assisted (through making a speech) at a meeting held under the
auspices of the Communist Party. The question of whether criminal syndicalism had been advocated at the meeting, had been ruled to be outside the issues
of the case by the state courts. In referring to the relevance of the "purpose"
of the meeting, the Court was not speaking of its possible hidden purpose, but
of the content of the particular meeting: whether it involved the advocacy
of syndicalism or merely peaceful measures.
44. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 442
(1950) (Jackson, J.,concurring in part).
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Effect of Committee Investigations on PubicistsThemselves
We have been concerned with the committee's broad effects on
traditions and public attitude that are part of first amendment freedom. Only a word need be said about a more obvious result of the
committee's investigations of alleged pro-Communists in the opinion
field-the effict on publicists themselves.
It hardly needs laborious demonstration to show that the committees' treatment with suspicion of a group of political ideas, tends
to make non-Communists who are concerned with protecting their
reputations, influence, or positions, hesitant and fearful about expressing a political opinion that may appear to fall in the suspect
class.

45

A spokesman of impregnable standing will of course" be relatively unaffected by the fact that an opinion has been branded proCommunist. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that not long after the
issuance of the McCarran Report castigating Lattimore's opinions,
a view similar to Lattimore's as to the possibility of Chinese
"Titoism," emphasized so adversely in the Report and the Lattimore indictment, was voiced by Senator Wiley, then chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." For the more vulnerable, however, the danger from an expression of views resembling
the Communist Party's on political issues is intensified by the fact
that any evidence of connection with the party, other than coincidence of views, may be of a type not susceptible to refutation.
Thus, in Lattimore's case the chief witness against him, the exCommunist Louis Budenz, did not maintain that Lattimore was a
"card-carrying" member or had any specific position in the party,
but rather that he was under Communist Party "instructions" with
respect to disseminating opinion on China that would be helpful to
the party's purposes.4- There is no form of proof that can be submitted .against such a charge other than the accused's bare word,
if his political views resembled for a period those adopted by the
party. Evidence of contradictions on some issues between party
positions and Lattimore's would avail nothing, since they might
45. It is true that a person is not likely to be suspected unless there is
a coincidence between his views and the Party "line" on a number of points,
-and there thus would be less inhibition about expressing an isolated coinciding
view than a series of them. However, a central non-Communist viewpoint

could give 'rise to a series of the views embraced in the Communist Party
"line," as, for example, a particular view as to power politics or the National-

ist regime could give rise to the series of opinions on China treated by, the

McCarran Committee as pro-Communist.
46. See N. Y. Times, June 30, 1953, p. 1, col. 5.
47. See Hearings, spra note 32, at 521-59.
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be the result of "exemptions" which according to Budenz the
party was wont to award on whatever points suited

it.

48

Even testi-

mony by other ex-Communists that they did not know of the person's supposed relation to the party-which in Lattimore's case was
supplied by Elizabeth Bentley 4 9-,vould only show that those individuals were not in on the alleged secret of the person's intellectual
vassalage.
The impossibility of refutation is again illustrated in the conflict
between Joseph Alsop, the well-known newspaper columnist, and
Budenz, with respect to John Carter Vincent. Budenz accused
Vincent, then a State Department employee, of acting for the Coinmunist Party when he accompanied Henry Wallace on a mission to
China in 1944, which also included Alsop.50 Alsop established that
Vincent had made positive anti-Communist recommendations. Indeed, Alsop explained that it was he rather than Vincent who was
the member of the mission who had opposed the appointment of
General Chennault to the Chinese command--opposition which
Budenz charged was pro-Communist and assumed was attributable
to Vincent."' But Alsop's expose of the fictitious quality of Budenz'
testimony was ignored. For the Committee then asked if Alsop
could deny, from first hand knowledge, that the Communist Party
was "instructing" Vincent, as Budenz claimed.5 2 Of course, Alsop
could not make the denial. 3
That a publicist would have a secret and informal connection
with the Communist Party, as Budenz claimed, if he had any at all,
seems likely. But his consequent difficulty in disproving a fabrication of a connection, facilitates a false charge against him of proCommunism when he has in fact done nothing more than express
views similar to the party line. The possibility of such a fabrication
intensifies the threat against a publicist who expresses views resembling those of the party, and by the same token intensifies the
discouragement of free expression resulting from the committees'
program of attempting to classify publicists as pro-Communist.
48. See Hearings at 554, 559. Thus, in view of Budenz' exposition, it
would have been futile to point out to the Committee that Lattimore praised
Chiang Kai Shek in his 1945 and 1949 book-Solution in Asia 80-86 (1945) ;
Situation in Asia 174-77 (1949)-though this was contradictory to the
Communist Party line in that period. Hearing at 551, 1011-21.
49. Hearings at 439.
50. Hearings at 625-26, 1081.
51. Hearings at 1447-48, 1472; also see 1081, 1404, 1086, 1024.
52. Hearings at 1451, 1470-72.
53. Ibid. Budenz testified that Vincent's alleged Communist connection
was a "secret shared by a few people" only. Hearings at 626.
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III. POSSIBLE DANGERS FPROM PRa-COMMUNISTS IN THE

OPiNioN FIELD

The committees' premise that any and every pro-Communist influence on public opinion is to be searched out and eliminated, is, we
have tried to show, contradictory to first amendment principles.
Under what circumstances would an investigation of suspected proCommunists in thg opinion field be consistent with first amendment principles?
Since one of the purposes of an investigation is to determine
whether there are dangers warranting legislation, an investigation
may of course be constitutional even though there is not sufficient
evidence of danger to support legislation on the same subject. But
there must at least be cause for "reasonable concern" that a danger
exists on which Congress could constitutionally act." Thus the first
step in consideraing what circumstances would justify an investiga-

tion of alleged Communists in the opinion field, is to consider when
their presence in this field would constitute a danger against which
Congress could constitutionally legislate.
Effect on Public Opini'n About International Issues
The primary danger from pro-Communists in the opinion field
would seem to be that the American people might adopt and enforce

on the government international positions they would not otherwise favor, under the influence of misrepresentations by pro-Communists in their midst. But, estimating the danger of ideological
success by the Communists 5 with first amendment principles in
mind, every insubstantial pro-Communist influence on public opinion cannot be considered to create this danger, as the committees
now seem to believe. Regardless of a pro-Communist's guile, he can
succeed in propagandizing non-Communists only if he produces an
argument that wins out in the non-Communist mind against the
opposing point of view. And the Government's toleration of erroneous opinions, mandated by the first amendment, does not envisage
a governmental distinction between error by reason of malice, bias,
or guile, and error by reason of simple ignorance; the power to
distinguish clean from unclean error would obliterate the injunction
against government dictation of truth and error.
54. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied,
334 U. S. 843 (1948) ; cited and followed in Wyman v. Sweezy, 24 U. S. L.
Week 2427 (N.I-L Aar. 6, 1956), slip sheet opinion, p. 8.
55. The Supreme Court's reasoning that a physical attempt at overthrow
of the government could be a substantial evil, regardless of the probability of
its success, Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 509 (1951), does not
apply to an attempt to propagandize, which is not in itself an evil and could
be dangerous only insofar as it is likely to succeed.
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Accepting, then, the first amendment premise that truth will
prevail over error in a free market of opinion, there would seemingly be a substantial danger of success for pro-Communist propaganda only if it were disseminated so extensively that normal
opportunities for evaluating truth and falsity were lacking. To
formulate a fairly cautious test, we could say a danger of Communist
ideological success would exist if a substantial proportion of the
organs of opinion in any locality or of any one medium of opinion
nationally, or if any publicist or group of publicists influential with a
substantial proportion of the public, disseminated pro-Communist
56
propaganda.
The supporters of the investigations might argue that even if
they agreed with such a test, present investigative procedure is consistent with it and with the first amendment. The argument would
be: Even if a committee has suspicious information on only a few
people in a medium, it must interrogate them, to find out whether
there is a substantial and dangerous monopolization of opinion
channels by pro-Communists. The difficulty with this approach, of
course, is that by the time the committee discovers that there is no
substantial monopolization, as it did for example in the case of the
clergy, the damage is done to first amendment traditions and concepts by the investigation itself. In Section IV of this article (p. 549)
we shall discuss a possible solution to this problem through a rule on
order of proof, which would require the committees to have a more
substantial basis for supposing that the alleged danger from proCommunism in the opinion field exists, before investigating the
suspected individuals.
Connection with Communist Party Objective of
Overthrow of Government
Even if there is no specific danger to public opinion from the
influence of pro-Communists in the opinion field, they and indeed
all pro-Communists, regardless of occupation, are said to present
a danger warranting governmental action and investigation, be56. A more absolutist first amendment position than that indicated in
the text would be that expression can only be controlled if it is in the
nature of an incitement to violence or other illegal acts; expression, it would
be argued, cannot be controlled as long as it merely serves as a stimulus
to opinion and entirely legal acts, regardless of the ultimate dangerous consequences for the nation. Compare Meiklejohn, Free Speech: And It Relation to Government c. II (1948), with Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673 (1925). The writer suggests, however, that
if there were a near-monopolization of the channels of communication, the
free flow of opinion envisaged by the first amendment as the corrective for
false prophets would not be operating, and other correctives would not then
violate the amendment
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cause they are all connected with the Communist conspiracy. The
argument here is that the basic objective of the Communist movement in this country is the overthrow of the United States Government; and since our Government is constitutionally justified in taking measures to prevent its overthrow, it is concerned with all
members and manifestations of a movement with this objective, no
matter whether the particular activity is in the field of opinion or
action. 57 On this theory, there would be no need for a showing of a
specific danger as justification for an investigation of suspected Communists in the opinion field. Any suspected pro-Communist from any
field would be equally subject to a committee summons. As counsel
for one of the investigating committees put it, their justification is
that they "... . want to run down every angle of the Communist
conspiracy. 58 Thus, in the recent Eastland investigation centering
on the New York Times, Senator Eastland repeated several times
that he was investigating Communism rather than the press, 8
though in fact it was clear, as the Senator himself indicated in other
statements, that it was Communists in this particular sphere of
activity who were under investigation.
Test of conspiracy theory in Subversive Activities ControlAct case.
The Supreme Court has not to date considered, either in regard
to investigation or legislation, the argument that any connection57. See*Barsky, v. United States 167 F. 2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) and see note 116 infra.
58. Statement of J. C. Sourwine, chief counsel to Internal Security Subconmittee of Senate Judiciary Committee, in questioning librarian for
private library of Plymouth Meeting, Pa. (Quaker community of 600 persons), after she had protested she had no connection with internal security.
N. Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1955, p. 14, col 4. The librarian had been discharged
from a previous library job after refusing to answer questions by the subcommittee on her past Communist connections, and the Fund for the Republic
of the Ford Foundation had given an award to Plymouth Meeting after it
engaged her.
59. N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1956, p. 16, coL 3; Jan. 5, 1956, p. 20, col 2.
Despite these verbal attempts to disclaim invasion of the opinion field, Senator
Eastland and other committeemen could not avoid articulating on occasion
the obvious fact that they were concerning themselves with the press and
with those particular suspected Communists who were engaged in newspaper
work At the opening of the January hearings, Senator Eastland stated: "The
subcommittee could not be unmindful of the fact that among the persons involved in this investigation have been many who were or are members of
the press, and that the internal Communist conspiracy has as one of its
primary aims the influencing of public opinion.... " Hearings supra note 1,
at p. 1587. See concluding statement by Senators Eastland and Jenner, that
the "investigations had disclosed 'a significant effort on the part of Communists to penetrate leading American newspapers." N. Y. Times. Jan. 7.
19 6, p. 1, col 6. Even newspapers that were sympathetic to the Eastland
Committee recognized the investigation concerned "attempts to infiltrate and
to influence American journalism." See editorial from N. Y. JournalAmerican, re-printed in round-up of editorials throughout country, N. Y.
Times,'Jam 8, 1956, p. 70, col. 3.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:517

with-the-conspiracy is sufficient per se to justify infringement of
first amendment rights. It may evaluate this position for the first
time in the pending case involving the registration order directed to
the Communist Party by the Subversive Activities Control Board." °
Under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,1 organizations
determined by the board to be "Communist-action" or "Communistfront" organizations, as defined in the act, are to register the names
of all their officers and members in registers open to the public."'
The legislative history makes clear that the major objective the
draftsmen thought to accomplish by this provision was to expose
to the public the identity of Communists in order to protect the
public against being misled by party line propaganda.0 With a
similar objective a subsidiary section of the act provides that all
organizations required to register as Communist action, front, or
infiltrated organizations must label their literature and broadcasts
as disseminated or sponsored by a Communist organization.0 4 Thus,
the act is a more formal effectuation of the same purpose of exposure, particularly in connection with party line propaganda, that
bulks large with the congressional committees investigating alleged
Communists in the opinion field.
The ultimate objective of the act is to prevent overthrow of the
Government6 5 and it was upheld on this basis in the lower court.00
The dissemination of party line propaganda by Communists on
political questions of general concern, which the act seeks to control
as do the congressional investigations, is obviously several steps re60. Since this article went to press, the case was decided without reaching this issue. The question will no doubt again be presented to the Court for
review. See note 10a supra. The order had been upheld by the Court of
Appeals. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F. 2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
61. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U. S.C.§§ 781-98 (1952).
62. 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U. S.C.§ 787 (1952).
63. The Senate Report on the bill which became the Act pointed out:
"The purpose of registration is ... (a) to expose the Communist movement
and protect the public against innocent and unwitting collaboration with it ;"
and "The proposed bill represents ...(2) a registration statute calculated to
effect disclosure of the identity and propaganda of individual Communists and
Communist organizations." The propaganda the draftsmen had in mind
was that concerning everyday political issues; the Report points out, in
justification for the Act's purpose of exposure, that

".

. . the present line of

the Party . . .is to avoid wherever possible the open advocacy of force and
violence." S. Rep. No. 1358, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7 (1950).
See also statements of draftsmen on the floor: 96 Cong. Rec. 14535.
14439-40, 14575, 14497-98 (1950).
64. 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U. S.C.§ 789 (1952).
65. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U. S.C.§ 781 (1952).
66. Communist Party of the United States v.Subversive Activies Control Board, 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), reversed on other grounds, see
note 10a supra.
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moved from the objectives of overthrow of the government, espionage, or sabotage. Hence, the connection-with-conspiracy argument
is important in the Government's defense of the act. The party's
advocacy of overthrow of the government and its seditious connection with the Soviet Union, the Government's brief argues,
warrants the registration requirement though it concededly may
restrain the party's peaceful and non-seditious activities."T The
Government likewise -urged this justification for the labeling provision, arguing that this requirement was justified for emxpressions
of opinion which were unobjectionable in their specific content
and immediate nature, because of the party's ultimate goal of
overthrow. 68 While neither the act nor the Government's brief
articulates the precise nature of the connections between part), line
propaganda and overthrow of the government, espionage or
sabotage, the connection presumably is that people attracted by this
propaganda may be led into the party or at least to aid the party,
and to eventually engage in the subversive acts.
Jiaonsisten-cy of tle conspiracy argument with first amendment
doctrines.
The connection-with-conspiracy approach, de-emphasizing the
nature and effect of the particular Communist activity, and treating
Communists and Communist activity as, in effect, fungible, preludes attention to the particular relationship between a restriction
and first amendment rights, and, in the case of investigations, precludes attention to the special damage to free expression when the
investigation of alleged Communists relates to those in the opinion
field. We suggest that this approach should therefore be rejected as
contrary to important lines of first amendment doctrine.
It has become an accepted concept in the Supreme Court that the
extent to which a particular measure restrains first amendment
rights must be weighed against the public interest alleged to justify
the restraint, to determine its constitutionality. The Court measures,
it says, "... which of these two conflicting interests demands the
greatest protection under the particular circumstances presented....
67. Brief for Respondent, pp. 90, 95, 100, Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra note 10a 66.
68. "What we have in this case is the Communist Party... engaged,
among its other activities, in widespread propaganda which, whatever the
immediate issue may happen to be, has always as its ultimate objective the
domination, by force, of this country. . . . Much of this propaganda is
covert, and all of it attempts to sell itself to the public as peacefully and lawfully inspired. ... The Party frequently ... plead[s] for various causes
which it thinks will advance its own falsely assumed status as a champion of
human rights." Brief for Respondent, pp. 167-68, supra note 67.
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In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of
the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly
against the ... evils of conduct.. . ." that Congress seeks to check. 9
Intertwined with this view that the Court must ponder and
weigh the impact of a restraint on first amendment freedoms, the
Court has over a number of years admonished that it has a more
scrupulous duty of review when first amendment rights are affected
than when property interests are being curtailed. 0 Some decisions
go even further than this general admonition, and enunciate a
special and strict criterion of validity for first amendment cases.
There, they say, the Court must not only consider whether the measure could reasonably be deemed related to a legitimate objective, as
it customarily does in determining constitutionality, but also whether
the measure imposes on first amendment rights an excessive restraint
which is unnecessarily broad to accomplish the legislative purpose.71
Quite recently, in invalidating the power of a state licensing board
to censor sacrilegious movies, the Court said that this was not "the
kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state
may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of
society. '' 72 Finally, as part of this blend and weave of doctrinal
threads, it is fundamental in first amendment discussions that the
proximate relation between the restrained expression and the threatened evil is the crux of validity: "Government may cut him [every
man] off only when his views are no longer merely views but
threaten, clearly and imminently, to ripen into conduct against
which the public has a right to protect itself." 73
69. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 397, 399, 400
(1950).
70. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 399, 400
(1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88 (1949) ; Schneider v. State, 308
U.
. 147, 161 (1939); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, n. 4 (1938).
71. A measure affecting freedom of expression must be "narrowly
drawn to meet the supposed evil." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307
(1940). "The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil
to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against attack
on due process grounds, will not suffice. .. ." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,

530 (1945). And see Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) ; Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 116 (1943) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.

88, 95, 96 (1940). Cf. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 23 (1955), where the

Court, pointing out that subjection of civilians to military trial was a restriction of their contitutional liberties, said: "Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to 'the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed'" (citing Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 230-31 (1821)).
72. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 504 (1952).
73. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 395
(1950). See discussion of the "clear and present danger" test, Dennis v.
United States, 341 U. S. 494, 501-11 (1951).

1956]

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

1539

These first amendment doctrines, if diligently applied, would, we
suggest, confound the approach that all sanctions relating to the
Communist movement or anyone connected with it are valid merely
by virtue of their connection with a movement to overthrow the
government. This connection should only be taken into account in
weighing justification, without blotting out concern for the extent
theparticular measure affects first amendment rights, the possibility
of narrower measures to avert the evil of overthrow, and the proxi4
mity-of the expression restrained to the evil of overthrow.T
It is anybody's guess whether the Court will get to the first
amendment question in the Subversive Activities case. T1 A holding
for or against the connection-with-conspiracy argument in that case
would, of course, be highly indicative of the validity of congressional
investigations of alleged Communists in the opinion field as well, for
the propaganda at issue in both cases is the same number of steps
renoved from attempts to overthrow the government or the commission of other illegal acts. If it is unconstitutional to pass legislation to control propaganda of a non-violent political nature even
though it is a facet of the Communist program, by the same token
a congressional investigation could not be justified constitutionally

on the ground of this relationship.
IV.

PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF INVESTIGATIONS
IN THE OPINION FIELD

So far we have appraised the investigations with what might
be criticized as a blithe disregard of the series of courts of appeals'
decisions from 1947 to 1950 upholding the movie investigation and
others dealing with alleged Communists in the opinion field.!0 There
the Courts did not take cognizance of the full effects, as we have
74. A caveat as to whether the Supreme Court will apply these doctrines
in a case involving the Communist issue: no majority opinion in any such

case has used the doctrine of a narrowly tailored restraint, and it has been
indicated that the proximity principle may have a tempered application when
a measure restricts, but does not directly penalize, expression. American

Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 392, 395-98 (1950).
75.

The registration provision might be invalidated on various other

grounds, such as violation of the privilege against self-incrimination or due
process. See dissenting opinion on former ground in Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F. 2d 531, 576
(D.C. Cir. 1954), reversed on non-constitutional grounds, see note 10a supra.
76. See cases cited note 12 supra. The confidence of the Court of
'Appeals for the District of Columbia in its much-cited Barsky holding might
be thought somewhat shaken in view of its statement in Ruinely that "The
doctrine has since [Barsky] been clarified and sharpened by the Supreme
Court" Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd,
345 U. S. 41 (1953). However, it has continued to cite Barsky as a precedent.
See United States v. Lattimore, 215 F. 2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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sketched them, of such investigations on first amendment rights,
nor did they seem to consider that the standard first amendment
doctrines we have discussed might be applicable to such investigations; they did, on the contrary, give weight to the connection-withconspiracy argument. However, there have been developments in
the law since these decisions, particularly in the Rumely case, that
might persuade the courts to re-visit and re-appraise the problem.
We now turn to this possibility.
The Rumely Decisions, in Perspective
The congressional power to investigate was for the first time
in our judicial history braked by the first amendment in United
States v. Rumely, which reached decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1953.7 Edward Rumely was secretary of the
"Committee for Constitutional Government," which distributed
books and leaflets of a rightist political slant on pending legislation.
CCG supporters either bought the publications from CCG in bulk
and then distributed them free, or merely paid for a quantity which
CCG then distributed free to the individuals or categories of persons the supporters specified.7 8 For instance, Lilly and Co., the drug
firm, directed CCG to distribute $25,000 worth of publications on
medical care plans to "school teachers, members of the clergy and
other influential groups of our local community ;-7' and publisher
Frank Gannett paid for distribution to other newspaper publishers
of a pamphlet favoring Taft-Hartley. 80
Rumely was called for questioning before a house committee
investigating lobbying. He refused to answer on the ground of the
first amendment when the investigating committee asked him for
the names of all persons from whom CCG had received more than
$500 for the purchase or distribution of books or pamphlets. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed his conviction for refusing to answer, holding that the question was outside the Committee's authority, and reasoning that it
unconstitutionally interfered with first amendment rights.8' In a
unanimous opinion by Frankfurter, J., the Supreme Court affirmed.
However, it refrained from ruling directly on constitutionality, and
was content to agree with the lower court's results on the less77. 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
78. Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1952), afI'd,
345 U. S.41 (1953).
79. Rumely v. United States, supra note 78, at 184.
80. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.41, 50-51 (1953).
81. Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
aff'd, 345 U. S.41 (1953).
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committal ground that the resolution authorizing the investigation
should be given a restricted construction to avoid constitutional
difficulty. Stressing the court of appeals' opinion as a demonstration
that the power claimed by the Committee raised constitutional
doubts,8 2 the Supreme Court held that to avoid doubts the enabling
resolution should be interpreted as authorizing an investigation of
only those lobbying tactics which deal with representations made
directly to the Congress and not with "attempts 'to saturate the
thinking of the community"' and to indirectly influence the legislative process.83
Because the Supreme Court's opinion was cursory, its significance can best be comprehended by first considering the opinion of
the court of appeals, whose view is also important in itself for the
purposes of this article because it served as the final court of review
in most of the past Communist propaganda cases."' The court of
appeals' conclusion that the questioning of Rumely violated the first
amendment starts from its recognition that "to publicize or report
to the Congress" the names of the purchasers and distributors of
Rumely's literature would have discouraged people from buying it,
because the "realistic effect of public embarrassment is a powerful
interference with the free expression of views."8 5 But, the court
continued, efforts to influence public opinion through information
and persuasion are a good, not an evil-a fundamental freedom
guaranteed by the first amendment against abridgement except for
urgent necessity. Here there was no showing that the distribution
of CCG literature to the public created a danger which would justify
legislative interference or an investigation as an aid to the legislative
process.15a Conclusion: Exposing the naries of purchasers, and thus
embarrassing them out of their attempts to influence public opinion
by buying and distributing CCG material, was unconstitutional.
Exposure as a restraint.
Though the Supreme Court did not go as far as the lower court,
it at least recognized that the questioning of Rumely affected first
amendment rights. The most cautious would have to agree that
the Supreme Court decision stands for this much. Its reasoning is
that if the questioning of Rumely were deemed authorized so that
its constitutionality became an issue, the Court would be presented
82. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46 (1953).

83. Id. at 45, 47.
84. See cases cited note 12 "upra.
85. Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd,
345 U. S. 41 (1953).
85a. See note 130 infra as to Court's view of when the distribution would
be dangerous.
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with the constitutional problem of balancing the investigatory power
against the first amendment.86 The only way the first amendment
came into play was on the theory that exposure means embarrassment and embarrassment leads to restraint of expression; and it is
this theory that the Supreme Court must have implicitly conceded
in agreeing that the questioning involved first amendment rights.
Against the background of its decisions, this was a major step for
the Supreme Court to take. Indeed, considering the present popularity of exposure as a technique of government,8" this development
has a significance broader than the field of investigations.
While the court of appeals had recognized prior to Rumely that
exposure by an investigating committee affects constitutional
rights,"" the Supreme Court had not previously come to this point.
Previously, the only way that congressional investigation invaded
individual constitutional rights, so far as the Supreme Court had
recognized, had been by interfering with the abstract right to
privacy and to be let alone. 9 And a seeming augury against the
86. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.41, 44, 48 (1953).
87. See p. 536 supra, as to registration requirement of Subversive
Activities Control Act, and p. 544 infra, as to previous registration acts; see
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.123 (1951), as
to listing of "subversive" and similar categories of organizations by tile
United States Attorney General.
88. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied.
334 U. S.843 (1948); compare Wyman v. Sweezy, 24 U. S. L. Week 2427
(N.H. Mar. 6, 1956), slip sheet opinion p. 7. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit did not seem to share this view. See Josephson v. United
States, 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 333
U. S. 838 (1948). The Supreme Court had not passed on the issue and had
denied certiorari in the Communist propaganda cases. Cases cited note 12
supra.
See Nelson v. United States, 208 F. 2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where
the Court emphasized the coercive atmosphere of a committee hearing since
...the 'investigative' activities of Congress have become less distinguishable
from the law enforcement activities of the Executive."
89. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S.263, 291, 292 (1929) ; NlcGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.135, 173 (1927) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U. S. 168, 190 (1880). The premise, generally implicit, was that such an
interference violated due process. See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597, 620 (1929) ; Hamilton, The Inquisitorial Power of
Congress, 23 A. B. A. J. 511 (1937). The Court has generally followed the
same abstract approach in cases of investigations by administrative agencies.
See Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 24, 26
(1936); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S.
298, 305-06 (1924) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S.
447, 478 (1894). In Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S.
407, 417 (1908), Justice Holmes was more specific and took some note of the
practical effect of the disclosure, saying that the I. C. C. was arguing for
power to compel the disclosure of ". . . any facts, no matter how private, no
matter what their tendency to disgrace . . ." the witness. See also Utah Fuel
Co. v. Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U. S. 56, 60 (1939), where the
Court took cognizance of the possible detrimental effect of disclosures forced
in an investigation, when it was alleged that business competitors would
thereby secure knowledge of secret business data.
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Court's acceptance of the theory that embarrassing public exposure
is an interference with first amendment rights, was its view that
pronouncements of investigators or other government agencies did
not constitute sanctions affecting legal rights, despite their effect
on public opinion. Thus, to a railroad's complaint that an Interstate
Commerce Commission report set forth an erroneous valuation for
its property which would injure its credit standing, the Court had
replied that the order was the "exercise solely of the function of
investigation"9 0 and that "neither its [the I.C.C.'s] utterances nor
its processes of reasoning, as distinguished from its acts, are a subject for injunction." 91 Despite the railroad's complaint of unfair
damage, the Court would not even consider whether the government
pronouncement was false, as the company claimed. 2 The Court
showed the same attitude when it considered a statute intended to
settle labor disputes through a board's recommendation of settlements and publication of its decisions. Though the very purpose of
the publication was to arouse the force of public opinion, and indeed the statute relied on this force to secure the participants'
adoption of the settlement, the Court did not recognize the publication of the decisions as an exercise of coercion, nor that any legal
or constitutional rights were affected by it. It refused to consider
the merits of the board's decision, and in effect said the board could
function without judicial control because it used no sanction but
public opinion.9 3
The Court showed more concern with the power the Government can vield by working on public opinion, in the recent Joint
Anti-Fascist case, when it held that the Attorney General's listing
of an organization as subversive was grounds for a cause of action.,Y
But there, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court assumed
the listing was false; it thereupon analogized to common law defamation as the basis for its holding that such a listing was a legal injury.
It had no occasion therefore, even if it 'wished, to recognize that
government exposure even of the truth could affect legal rights, as
it did by implication in the Rumely case. When, after Rumely, the
Supreme Court was confronted with a case testing the constitutionality of the requirement for lobbyists to register, it seemed to
90. United States v. Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. R., 273 U. S. 299,

310 (1927).
91.

Id. at 314-15.

92. Id. at 310.
93. Pennsylvania Rh R. v. United States R. R. Labor Board, 261 U. S.
72, 79 (1923).

94. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123

(1951).
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accept as established doctrine that the embarrassment of disclosure
and exposure, though of the truth, could work a restraint on the
exercise of first amendment rights."
In the pending Supreme Court test of the validity of the order
to the Communist Party to register itself as a "Communist-action"
organization within the meaning of the Subversive Activities Control Act, the exposure effected by the registration undoubtedly constitutes a restraint on first amendment rights, and the Government
so admits in its briefy Here, by defining a "Communist-action"
organization in highly opprobrious terms as an organization engaged in treachery and destruction of this Government, and requiring an organization to register as such, something has been
added to the registration technique used in previous acts such as
the Foreign Agents' Registration Act" and the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying ActY5 There, only statements of certain facts were required, and any opprobrium arose from what the facts themselves
disclosed; here the Government itself stigmatizes by affixing a
label.
In sum, then, starting from a position that the Government
was not even imposing a sanction when it effected exposures or
worked on public opinion, the Supreme Court proceeded to a recognition that the Government inflicted legally cognizable injury if it
made an erroneous disclosure, and has now proceeded to the point
that exposure even of the truth is recognized as a restraint. Particularly and a fortiori it would be a restraint, we believe, though
the Court has not yet passed on the case, if the Government increases the embarrassment of the exposure by attaching a stigma,
as it does under the Subversive Activities Control Act and in effect
by the congressional investigations.
Necessity for "accommodation" of the investigatory power to the
first amendment.
Though the Supreme Court's decision in Runtely may seem
rather abbreviated support for an extended exegesis, nevertheless
its holding there marks an advance in its view on another aspect
of the investigative power, besides the coercion by governmental exposure. The reason the Court gave there for its restricted construc95. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 625 (1954).
96. Brief for Respondent, pp. 90, 95, 100, Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, cited note 10a supra.
97. At issue on non-constitutional grounds in Viereck v. United States,
318 U. S. 236 (1943).
98. At issue in the Rumley and Harrisscases.
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tion of the statute was its wish to avoid the constitutional problem of
accommodating the investigatory power to the first amendment.0
The Court had not previously employed such a concept of balance
and compromise in determining the validity of a congressional investigation.
Since its much criticized decision of Kilbourn v. Thompson"0
in
1880, invalidating an investigation, the Supreme Court has invariably upheld the congressional investigative power and countenanced its broad sweep. Giving Congress a loose rein, the Court
has asserted that Congress' investigative power extended to investigations "'with a view to possible exercise of its legislative function; ' ' 101 that no specific legislation had to be in contemplation; that
if there were even a possible legitimate purpose, the investigation
would be presumed to be in good faith.' 02 The question of validity
seemed to be settled if an investigation as a whole or a question in
its course met this broad test. In effect, if there was a reason in
terms of public interest for exercise of the investigative power, the
matter under inquiry ceased, by the same token, to be a "private
affair" immune from investigation. 0 3
In contrast to the judicial process in the old cases, the Court
emphasized in Rumdey the gravity of the issue of "accommodation"
of the investigatory power to the first amendment.' 0' Thus, the
99. See note 83 supra and text thereto.

100. 103 U. S. 168 (1880). As to criticism, see Rumely v. United States,

345 U. S.41, 46 (1953), and articles there cited; Herwitz and Mulligan, The
Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1933).
101. United States v. Norris, 300 U. S.564, 573 (1937).
102. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.135, 177, 178 (1927) ; Sin-

clair v. United States, 279 U. S.263, 294 (1929) ; see also Barry v. United

States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S.597, 614, 620 (1929) ; Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-78 (1951). See Landis, ConstitutionalLitnitaionson
the CongressionalPower of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 194 (1926);
Herwitz and Mulligan, op. cit. supra note 100 at 8; Note, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
416, 423 (1947) ; compare Coudert, CongressionalInvestigatlion versus Individual Liberty, 15 Va. L. Rev. 537 (1929).
103. Cases cited note 102 supra. Nevertheless, in the cases involving
investigations by administrative agencies, rather than congressional committees, the Court condemned "fishing expeditions" into documents on the
investigators' mere hope of finding pertinent data; there the right to privacy
seemed to be honored despite the fact that the information requested might
have aided a legitimate administrative purpose. See Jones v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 298 U. S.1, 26 (1936) ; Federal Trade Commission
v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S.298, 305-06 (1924) ; Ellis v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 237 U. S.434, 445 (1915). And see Hearst v. Black,
87 F. 2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (administrative agency aiding congressional
committee). Compare United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S.632 642
(1950); see Davis, Administrative Law 112-13 (1951), who views the
Morton case as confirmation of a tendency to weaken "the inhibition against
fishing expeditions"; see also Davis supra at 92, 106-07, 136.
104. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.41, 48,44 (1953). If the lenient
legislative purpose test of the previous cases had been followed, the Court
probably could not have regarded the questioning of Rumley as of doubtful
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Court seems to be talking about its own previous approach to the
validity of congressional investigations, as well as President Wilson's,10 5 when it declares that he "did not write in light of the
history of events since he wrote; more particularly he did not
write of the investigative power of Congress in the context of the
first amendment." 10 6
Test of proper "accommodation" of investigatingpower to
first amendment.
What is the gauge of whether a constitutional "accommodation"
has been made between the investigatory power and the first amendment, and to what extent will the usual first amendment doctrine
of weighing restraint against justification' 0 7 be applied to the investigative power? The Supreme Court's Rinely opinion does not
go far enough to indicate an answer; but the court of appeals' decision suggests what seems to us a sound and worthwhile test
of "accommodation."
One of the Government's arguments in Rumely was that the
Lobbying Act required the report of all contributions over $500,
and that the investigating committee was interested in violations
of this reporting requirement. For this reason, the Government
lawyers claimed, the Committee was justified in questioning Rumely
as to purchasers of over $500 worth of CCG literature, in order
to investigate whether purchasing was a device to avoid the Lobbying Act's requirement for the report of contributions. The court
agreed that disguising contributions as purchases might be an evil
within the legitimate interest of the Committee and that one way of
discovering concealed contributions might be to obtain the names of
alleged purchasers so they might be questioned. Nevertheless, under
the circumstances, the Court would not countenance the exposure
of their names with the resulting embarrassment and the consequent
restraint on the first amendment right to influence public opinion.
Before resorting to exposure and restraint, the Committee had to be
more certain that there was a violation. It at least had to first
constitutionality; Rumley's interrogation would have met this test if only
through the committee's allegation that it had to investigate the "purchases" of
Rumely's literature to determine whether they were a device to avoid the
Lobbying Act's requirement for the report of contributions. See Runiely v.
United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U. S.41 (1953).
105. See note 142 infra and text thereto.
106. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.41, 44 (1953). An indication
of the force of Runely is that it was cited by Chief Justice Warren, apparently for its first amendment holding, in discussing limitations on the investigative power in Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161, n. 23 (1955).
107. See notes 69-73 supra and texts thereto.
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examine CCG's financial records to see if there was a factual basis,
instead of mere speculation, for suspecting that contributions were
being disguised as purchases. 1°8
As to the questions which the committee directed to Rumely
about general propaganda activities, the court of appeals emphasized
that a mere vague and tangential connection between a question
and a legitimate legislative purpose was insufficient. It pointed out
that the Committee's authority to question Rumely in some respects
about his lobbying activities did not mean that questions about all
his distributions of propaganda were "pertinent" within the meaning of the contempt statute punishing a refusal to answer "pertinent" questions:
"Especially it is true that power over a subject matter involving
speech, press, religion, assembly and petition does not go beyond
the power to do that which is essential to be done in protection
against a public danger."' 08
The court of appeals says in essence that in the investigative
process it is not enough that the information sought is related to a
legitimate legislative objective. In seeking the information care
must be taken to guard first amendment rights against unnecessary
108. -Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1952),

aff'd, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
109. Id. at 176. While the Court here emphasized the first amendment,
it is to be noted that it recently also applied a strict test of pertinency in a
non-first amendment case. In Bowers v. United States, 202 F. 2d 447 (D.C.
Cir. 1953), the Court held that in an investigation of organized crime's use
of interstate facilities, it was not "pertinent" to question a witness as to
whether he "knew" an alleged interstate gambler, since such knowledge could
be based on a mere casual acquaintance, and in that event would not be
significant And -the question could not be deemed pertinent merely because
it might be a preliminary to another question which would be pertinent.
The Bowers case was cited on this point in Wyman v. Sweezy, 24 U. S. L.
Wreek 2427, slip sheet opinion p. 2 (N.H. Mar. 6, 1956). Compare In re
Barnes; 204 N. Y. 108, 97 N. F_ 508 (1912), for a similar limited interpretation of pertinency. Compare United States v. Icardi, 24 U. S. L. Week 2484
(April 19, 1956) (D.D.C.), (reprinted in N. Y. Times, April 20, 1956, p. 10),
where the Court held that the "slim conjecture" that an answer might affect
a committee'sconclusion in regard to a matter of legitimate legislative concern was not enough to render the answer "material" therefore for the purpose
of a perjury prosecution.
The court of appeals' treatment of a purportedly preliminary question
as impertinent under the contempt statute, contrasts markedly with the frequent ruling under the perjury statute that testimony is "material" and thus
within the scope of the statute if it has a "tendency to influence, impede or
dissuade the investigating body from pursuing its investigation." United
States v. Moran, 194 F. 2d 623, 626 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 965
(1952) and cases there cited. It would seem appropriate for "pertinency" for
the purpose of the Federal contempt statute, and "materiality" for the nurposes
of the Federal perjury statute, to receive the same construction. In other
respects, the two statutes have been treated as analogous. See Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U. S. 263, 298 (1929) ; and compare, it re Chapman, 166
U. S. 661 (1897) (contempt), with Seymour v. United States, 777F. 2d 577
(8th Cir. 1935) (perjury).
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and avoidable restraints. The court's approach is reminiscent of
the most liberal strand in the Supreme Court's first amendment
decisions: the view that a statute is invalid if the evil could be
remedied by a narrower measure, less obstructive of free expression. 110 This seems a logical development. Once the courts recognize, as they now do, that questioning and exposure works a restraint on first amendment rights, and that Congress is using part
of its legislative power and is subject to the first amendment when it
investigates as well as when it legislates,' the next step would be
for them to apply to investigations the first amendment precedents
developed with regard to legislation.
The law on investigatory power, like all else, is certainly a seamless web, and the court of appeals' approach in Rumely has parallels
outside the first amendment field, particularly in the Supreme Court's
admonitions against "fishing expeditions. 1"

2

Still, the Runtely case

taken with first amendment doctrine generally, supports the view
that there must be special attention to relevance and necessity when
the committee's question results in a restraint on expression and
communication of opinion.
Applying Rumely Doctrines to Investigations of Alleged
Communists in the Opinion Field
Within this developing legal framework, would a court take
cognizance of the serious impact on first amendment freedoms of
congressional investigations of alleged Communists in the opinion
field, and might it reach a different result from the early decisions
upholding such investigations?
There are two branches to a decision on validity under the first
amendment: One, consideration of whether there is a restraint on
first amendment rights, and its gravity; and two, consideration of
whether the restraint is justified. What we shall call, as an abbreviation, the Rumely doctrines, could be applied to enlarge the court's
view on both branches of the first amendment issue; since the possible developments on the justification phase are the more significant,
we shall consider them first.
110. See cases cited note 71 supra.

111. The investigative power is an adjunct of the legislative. See notes
145, 146 and 147 infra and texts thereto.
112. See note 103 supra. Particularly significant is Ellis v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 237 U. S. 434, 445 (1915), where the Court did not
merely condemn the general breadth of an investigation but also the sequence
of proof. While most of the "fishing expedition" cases concern blanket seizures
of papers in the hope of turning up something material to the investigation,
Justice Holmes in Ellis condemned as a "fishing expedition" questions about
a company's affairs because the investigators only hypothesized, and did not
first establish, its relationship with another company on which their pertinency
to the investigation hinged.
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Closerscrtiny of justificationfor investigation-orderof proof.
One wing of the judicial reasoning in the early decisions upholding the investigations was: the committee was investigating
whether the public was being propagandized against our form of
government; Communists believe in overthrow of the govern-ment; it was therefore appropriate to ask people in an opinion
media, such as script-writers, whether they were Communists in
order to determine whether there was such subversive propaganda
1 13
in the movies.
In this syllogism, the Court ignored the first amendment doctrine which came into play in Rumwly--that the means used to
investigate whether an alleged evil exists must be those least damaging to freedom of expression. In Rumely, it is to be recalled, this
doctrine led to the holding that Rumely could not be asked the
names of the "purchasers" of CCG literature in order to discover
whether they were disguised contributors, until there was a showing
from the financial records of grounds for this suspicion. If such a
test had been applied to the Hollywood Ten, a basis should have
been laid for questioning them by a showing that the supposed evil
-movie propaganda against the government--existed. Instead,
4
this evil was a theoretical conjecture, which was never establishedU
113. Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.

denied, 339 U. S. 934 (1950).

114. The most the committee could find were three or four movies with

a sympathetic view of labor in labor-management disagreements, or a sympathetic and laudatory attitude towards Russia during this country's wartime
alliance with Russia. See Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities 58-67 (1952). Even under theMorford case, infra note 131, this would
hardly qualify .as propagapda against our form of government.
Compare the investigative procedure and judicial approach in Wyman v
Sweezy, 24 U. S. L. Week 2427 (N.H. lar. 6, 1956). The State Attorney
General, under authority to investigate advocacy or teaching of overthrow of
the government, questioned Sweezy on whether he had made certain statements on Socialism in a lecture he had given to state university students.
Sweezy was an acknowledged Marxist and had written an article which could
be interpreted as showing some receptivity to the idea of violence under some
circumstances. The court, while upholding the questioning, held that the Attorney General was limited to "school lectures... concerning which he
possesses reasonable or reliable information indicating that the violent overthrow of existing government may have been advocated or taught.... [He]
could not legally... examine private citizens indiscriminately in the mere
hope of stumbling upon valuable information" (slip sheet opinion, p. 5). The
court also held Sweezy could be questioned about the formation of the Progressive Party and its connection with the Communist Party, since the Attorney General had information as to the influence and infiltration of the
former by the latter. Id. at 6. It is to be noted that the questioning, particularly with regard ot the delivery of the lecture, related to actual content rather
than the character of the speaker. The decision is subject to criticism from the
first amendment standpoint because the court was not concerned with whether
there was any indication of any substantial danger of advocacy of violence in
the state. However, its view that even an isolated incident can justify an
investigation is less detrimental to freedom of expression when the issue is
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Again, if it were argued that an investigation in the opinion field
was justified as a means of determining if the party line was substantially influencing or dominating public opinion,"' the first step
in the investigation would be to establish that a substantial amount
of propaganda coinciding with the party line was being disseminated.
Only after there was at least this much objective evidence that Communists might be exerting a substantial pro-Communist influence
on political opinion, could the committee investigate whether persons in the media were pro-Communist. 16 If there were no reasonable indication of substantial pro-Communist propaganda in the
movies, radio, newspapers, or other medium, so there would be no
justification for questioning writers or other employees in that
medium to discover its source, there would be no basis for questioning them as to suspected Communism at all; questioning people
in the opinion field in the vague hope of getting data on some
Communist activity other than propaganda, would be a pure "fishing expedition. 11 7 We must add the caveat: If there were evidence
specifically connecting an individual in opinion work with some
dangerous activity outside this field, he might well be investigated in
that other connection.ll1a
whether violence was advocated than when the investigation concerns the
expression of peaceable party line views (See supra, pp. 524-8).
115. See p. 534 supra.
116. Reasoning of this type in regard to an investigation outside the
opinion field, was employed in Watkins v. United States, 24 U. S. L. Week
2329 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 1956), in a decision by three judges of the court.
It was, however, reversed by the court sitting en banc, 24 U. S. L. Week 2498
(D.C. Cir. April 23, 1956) ; petition for certiorari will probably be filed.
Watkins, a union organizer, had refused to tell the House Un-American
Activities Committee, which purportedly was investigating the need for
additional legislation to combat Communist infiltration in unions, whether
certain individuals had been Communists in the period between 1942 and
1947. The first decision concluded that the question was not pertinent to the
inquiry authorized by the enabling resolution, because the Government had
not shown it had any purpose and effect other than to expose the names of
the individuals. Important to this conclusion was the following reasoning:
"The Committee made no attempt to learn from Watkins either the
total number of Communists in his union, or what position Communists
held in the union, or whether or how, or how far, or in what direction,
they influenced the union. The Committee showed no interest in anything but a list of names. Whether Communist infiltration of union,
creates a need for legislation would seem to depend on the number, and
the nature, extent and effectiveness of the activities, of Communists in
unions." (Slip sheet decision, pp. 7-8.) The full court, in reversing, held
that it was pertinent to the "numerical strength at various times" of the
Communist Party, "as part of an inquiry into the extent of the menace
it poses," to inquire "whether thirty persons were Communists between
1942 and 1947"; further, it was pertinent to an investigation of Communist
infiltration into labor unions to inquire "whether certain persons, members of the union, were indeed Communists."
117. See note 112 supra.
117a. See United States v. Icardi. 24 U. S. L. Week 2483 (D.D.C.
April 19, 1956) : "The Court (toes hold that if the committee is not pursuing
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This rule as to order of proof would have invalidated the Eastland Committee hearings insofar as they concerned the New York
press. These hearings consisted primarily of calling up more than a
score of newspapermen to ask them if and when they had been
Communists and the names of anyone they had known to be Communists. 118 The view of Senator Henning, a member of the Committee that the "end product, the newspaper itself" should be examined to see if there was subversion, was totally ignored in the
public hearings. 1 9 And, at the close, Senator Eastland declined to
comment on whether the "significant effort on the part of Communists to penetrate leading American newspapers," which he and
Senator Jenner said had occurred, 20 had achieved any success. It
was clear from this refusal and the omission in the public sessions of
any mention of subversive or subverted content of the papers, that
the rumored attempt in executive session' 2 ' to find evidence of
slanted reporting on the part of the accused newspapermen, if made,
had failed.
If an "order of proof" rule was adopted from the court of
appeals' decision in Rumnely and similar decisions122- to the investigations of alleged Communist subversion in the opinion field, we
would no longer be faced with the contradiction of first amendment
principles on the basis of preconceived evils that theoretically might
appear but do not in fact materialize. There would have to be some
reality of danger, rather than hypothesis and speculation, before we
would suffer the serious curtailment of freedom of expression that
12 3results from the investigations.
a bona fide legislative purpose when it secures the testimony of any witness,
it is not acting at a 'competent' tribunal; even though that very testimony
be relevant to a matter which could be the subject of a valid legislative
investigation."

118. See Hearings supra note 1, pa.ssim; and see column by James
Reston, N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1956, p. 7, coL 2.
119. Hearings mspra note 1, at p. 1588.
120. N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1956, p. 70, coL 6. It is interesting to consider
whether, despite the inconclusive outcome, the hearings contributed to such
action as the cancellation by a school board of subscriptions to the New York
Times for high school social studies classes. As to this action in Solvay, N. Y.,
see N. Y. Times, March 10, 1956, p. 20, col. 3.
121. Closed hearings were held in December. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 8,

1955, p. 25, col. 3.

122. See notes 103 and 109 supra.
123. Even supposing that the pre-conditions for investigating alleged
Communists in the opinion field were established-that is, that propaganda
against our form of government or substantial dissemination of opinion
coinciding with the Communists' were found-so that under our rule of
order of proof the committee could proceed to investigate the alleged Communists, the investigation would have a less serious effect on free expression
than under the present wide-open procedure. Under this order of proof, the
pre-conditions that justified the investigation would be its focus and the mere
free play of opinion would not, as now (stpra,pp. 523-4, 526-530) be treated
as, and appear to be, the evil.
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Recognition of full extent of restraintimposed by investigation.
Taking a leaf from the court of appeals' Rumely opinion, the
courts might well give closer study not only to the justifications
alleged for the investigations, but also to the scope of the restraint
on expression resulting from them. The courts did not in the early
cases see the first amendment problem in the round, we believe, for
they saw the investigations as a restraint only on the right to believe
in Communism and associate with the Communist Party; it may
be noted that this restricted view probably was in part due to the
1 emphasis of the defendants on this right. 1,2' Now, following through

on the exposure results in non-participation view, developed by the
court of appeals in Rumey, the courts should take cognizance of
the broader restraints on first amendment rights that result from
investigations of alleged Communists in the opinion field.
With the guidance of the Rumely precedent, a court could
recognize that an investigation of suspected Communists in an
opinion medium-whether they be script-writers, clergymen, or
newspapermen-not only affects the right to subscribe to Coinmunism but also restrains the ones investigated from participating in
the medium.
It is true that participation in the medium of expression is not
the sole reason the alleged Communist is investigated; one factor
obviously is his alleged Communism. But his work in the medium
is certainly a but-for cause of the investigation and of his possible
embarrassing exposure as a Communist. Even the titles the committees usually give their investigations (e.g., "Infiltration of the
Movie Industry") recognize that they are focusing an alleged Communists in a particular medium or occupation; the tenor of the
investigation is certainly that the alleged Communists are being
investigated because they have "infiltrated" a particular field; it is
apparent that the committees are not attempting to call every Communist in the country, and that if the person lies low, and does not
participate in his medium of expression, he is not as likely to be
1 25
As in Runley, where the price of
investigated by the committee.

expressing one's views through CCG would be exposure as a contributor (and the court of appeals considered exposure to be a restraint on the right to contribute), so also possible exposure as a
Communist is the price of writing for newspapers, lecturing, or
124. See Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 934 (1950) ; Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241,
244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
125. See note 59 supra.
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participating in other opinion media, and acts as a restraint on the
right to so participate.
A distinction to be noted from Rumely is that if the question had
been permitted-if Rumely had had to name his contributors- their
embarrassing exposure would necessarily result; in the Communist
*investigations embarrassment will result, theoretically, only if the
investigatee answers the question in the affirmative by stating that
he is a Communist. 6 But even on the hypothesis that the investigation would embarrass the investigatee and interfere with his right
of expression only if he were a Communist, the investigation none
the less restrains a fundamental first amendment right; for, under
the De Jonge doctrine, the right of expression belongs to every man,
regardless of his past, present, or future, except for statements that
transcend constitutional limits. 1

There should be a greater possibility of a court's invalidating an
investigation if it were recognized as a restraint on the alleged Communist's right to participate in a medium of expression rather than
merely his right to subscribe to Communism. For one thing, with
advocacy of overthrow of the government viewed as the central
belief of Communism, the right to subscribe to Communism is a
first amendment right easily outweighed by the danger presented.'
Then, too, as a concomitant of recognition that the investigation
restrains participation in a medium of expression, and infringes on
the De-Jonge principle, the court could well take cognizance of the
126. This distinction might well be disregarded by the courts. In the
early courts of appeals' decisions on the Communist investigations, the courts
recognied that questioning the defendants as to whether they were Communists exposed them to embarrassment, though they did not admit in the
judicial proceedings that they were Communists. See Barsky v. United
States, 167 F. 2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948). The
situation is similar to that of self-incriminating questions, where the privilege
is upheld if the question is such that a certain answer would be incriminating,
without the necessiti for the person invoking the privilege to show what
would be his answer. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486-87
(1951):"... [I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to
prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege,
it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result. . . "
Similarly it would not be feasible to say that a person can refuse to
answer whether he is a Communist because the question is an unconstitutional
restraint, only if he is a Communist. His refusal would under this doctrine
accomplish the embarrassment the doctrine would be intended to avoid.
127. See note 43 supra and text thereto.
128. See Frankfurter, J., in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494,
544-45 (1951).
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serious effect of the investigation on the enjoyment of free expression by the public as a whole. 129
While we believe that the investigations in the opinion field as
presently conducted, could, with good logic from both the investigations and the first amendment cases, be held invalid, whether any
court would go that far in defense of the first amendment is difficult
to foretell. To date, even when Communism has not been involved,
the courts have been lenient about "indirect" restraints on expression through registration measures and the like.'"0 When Communism has been involved, they have seemed untroubled by the
thought that the free flow of political opinion for all the people
is discouraged when restraints are imposed on opinion on the basis
of its coincidence with the party line. 13 1 And, to date, except for the
129. See, for examples of the Court's concern for the broad and indirect
reprecussions of an interference with the first amendment rights, Wileman v.
Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97
(1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164 (1939).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954) where
the Court upheld the requirement for registration of lobbyists, despite the
restraint it imposed on first amendment rights, because congressmen need
to know whether they are being addressed by "special interest groups . . .
masquerading as proponents of the public weal [and] cannot be expected to
explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected." Id. at
625. And the Court was undisturbed by the view that there might be a
restraint of "self-censorship" on those who are not in fact within the Act
but may fear that they are. Id. at 626. The Supreme Court overrode the more
libertarian thought expressed in an earlier case by the court of appeals, which
had questioned the need for registration of lobbyists on the ground that
".. . members of Congress need read only that which they want to read."
Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345
U. S.41 (1953).
It is to be noted, however, that even in the latter opinion, the court of
appeals suggested that influences on public opinion might be considered an
evil if they were "bought or prostituted," or were in fact a "vast operation."
Id. at 174.
131. Thus, in Morford v. United States, 176 F. 2d 54 (D.C. Cir.
1949), reversed on other grounds, 339 U. S. 258 (1950), the Court apparently
saw little distinction between advocacy by Communists of violent overthrow
of the government and their peaceful propaganda on other issues, despite the
great difference in the effect of restraints in these two areas on free expression
by others. The Court there held that adverse criticisms of United States
foreign policy and praise of Russia's were open to investigation because
they could be taken as ".

.

. an attack on the principle of our form of govern-

ment ..
" Id. at 56. See, for a decision with the same tendency, Marshall v.
United States, 176 F. 2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 933
(1950). See also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(appeal on first indictment), where the court upheld the materiality, as a
matter of law, of questions to Lattimore on whether there were Communist
contributors to a magazine he edited since it was an ".

.

. admitted source of

scholarly matter on Asiatic problems ..
" Id. at 851. And it dispatched the
bulk of defendant's first amendment arguments with the statement: "Even
if Lattimore, as the editor of a publication, had a right not to speak, he did
not have a right to speak falsely." Id. at 855. It ignored the possibility that
the question should not be considered "material" to a lawful inquiry if it
infringed the first amendment, and therefore a false answer would not be
perjury.
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United States District Court which sat in the Lattimore cases z' - and
except for dissenting opinions,"' there has been little indication in
the cases involving Communism of the usual awareness and protectiveness of first amendment rights.
O'Connor case.
How much the courts will respond to a first amendment plea
will receive a test in the pending appeal of Harvey O'Connor, who
was sentenced for contempt of Congress for his refusal to answer
whether he had been a member of the "Communist conspiracy"
when he wrote certain books on the American social scene.'14 Like
many of the interrogations of alleged Communists in the opinion
field, the added wrinkle in the case is that the investigation was
allegedly justified on the ground that the writer had some type of
connection with the executive branch. Senator McCarthy, who
called O'Connor for questioning before a sub-committee of the Committee on Government Operations, maintained that one or more
of his books was in an overseas library of the United States Information Service, and whether or not he was a Communist when he
wrote it bore on-the question of maladministration of the Service.
In rejecting O'Connor's first amendment plea, the district court
said:
".... the avowed purpose of -this program... was to disseminate
information abroad 'about the United States, its people, and
policies promulgated by the Congress...'... Congress... has
the right to know if the ideas being disseminated are truly representative of the avowed purpose. To such an end, it is quite
pertinent to know whether, at the time authors wrote books
being used in furtherance of the purpose, they were supporting
...

communism....
"The facts justifying pertinency also justify the abridgement

132. United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507 (D. D.C. 1953), aff'd,
215 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (first appeal); 127 F Supp. 405 (D. D.C.
1955), aff'd by an equally divided court, (D.C. Cir. 1955) (second appeal).
133. See, e.g., dissent by Edgerton, J., in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.
2d 241, 252-63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 843 (1948) ; dissents by
Justices Douglas and Black, Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485,
496, 508 (1952) ; partial dissent by Frankfurter, J., Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U. S. 716, 726 (1951). The majority frequently had failed to take
cognizance of any effect of the anti-Communist measures upon first amendment rights. See, e.g., majority opinions in Adler v. Board of Education,
supra, and Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra.
134. See United States v. O'Connor, 135 F. Supp. 590 (D. D.C. 1955).
appeal pending, D. C. Cir., Case No. 13049.
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rights under the First Amendment to the
of the defendant's
135
Constitution."'
Adopting the reasoning from Rumely that we have already discussed, 3 ' the restraint on first amendment rights resulting from
the questioning of O'Connor, as here conducted, is clear. The price
of his or anyone's writing a book which may be used by the Government is possible exposure and consequent embarrassment as a Communist, if one has had any associations which might be grounds for
suspicion of Communist adherence. Thus, O'Connor's questioning
meant a restraint, through exposure and embarrassment, on the
De Jonge right of everyone to express opinions within constitutional
limits, regardless of his affiliations or motives.
Thus, if the court of appeals in the O'Connor case views first
amendment rights as it did in Rumely, it may invalidate O'Connor's
conviction because the investigation worked a restraint on first
amendment rights which might have been avoided by a different
"order of proof." Under an order of proof protective of the first
amendment, before investigating O'Connor's alleged Communism,
the committee first would have had to investigate its suspicion of
misfeasance in the Information Service by methods less interfering
with first amendment right; that is, by first inquiring into its procedure for selecting its books, its standards, and its personnel. 101
The next step would have been to consider the content of the books
by O'Connor used by the Service. Even if O'Connor had then
finally been questioned, the interrogation would have been set in the
perspective of the propriety of the procedures of the Information
Service, rather than of opprobrium towards an alleged Communist's
publication of a book, and fear of its distribution.' 3Ta Government
operations are so ramified that some connection could be alleged between them and the activities of almost any publicist. Development
of an order-of-proof rule would help prevent investigating committees from launching unjustified inquiries that diminish the appreciation and zest for free expression in this country.
135. Id. at 596.
136. See pp. 552-4 supra.
137. Even aside from the deference due first amendment rights and the
strict pertinency requirement when they are affected (see note 109 supra and
text thereto), the Court's view that questioning authors was one of the most
"direct" ways of investigating the operations of the Service seems odd; even
under the ordinary test of pertinency and the right of freedom from unnecessary infringement of privacy, this type of questioning should be considered
invalid. See notes 103, 109 and 112 mipra.
137a. Compare probably effect on public attitudes towards free cxpression resulting from the type of investigation conducted in Wyman v. Sweezy,
supra note 114, with that in United States v. O'Connor, sispra note 134.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

V. CONGRESS' FUNCTION TO INFORM THE PUBLIC
The investigations could burst the bounds of all judicial restraint
and the first amendment, if one of the justifications put forward by
.their defenders was accepted-that Congress can and should inform
the public on the dangers of Communism and expose to the public
the identity of persons of Communist sympathy.
Despite the constant assumption by the committeeslas and even
by some commentators that a function of congressional investigative
committees is to inform the public,139 there is little support in legal
doctrine for the view that the objective of informing the public
furnishes a basis for exercise of investigative power. Congress' informing function was not even mentioned by the courts until the
past few years. In the Josephson case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit remarked that since exposure of
Communists appeared to be merely incidental to the legislative purpose of the House Un-American Activities Committee, it had no
occasion to determine if exposure in itself would justify an investigation.140 Without deciding whether or not Congress had an informing function, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia indicated in Rumely that in any event that
function was not of sufficient stature to justify an investigation
interfering with first amendment rights.' 4 1 Only in the Supreme

Court's Ruinely opinion, in what must be labeled the purest dictum,
is the informing function given definite recognition.
The opinion first quotes Woodrow Wilson's statenent:
"'Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative
agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn
how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these
things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country
must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very
affairs which it is most important that it should understand and
direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function.' Wilson, Congressional Government, 303."i42

Justice Frankfurter, the author of the opinion, whose interest in the
138. See note 22 mupra.
139. See 18 Chi. L. Rev. 421 (1951) (Introduction by Dean Ed%%ard H.
Levi of Chicago Law School to issue of Review devoted to articles on Congressional investigations); Herwitz and Mfulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 Colun. L. Rev. 1 (1933).
140. United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U. S.838 (1948).
141. Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
aff'd, 345 U. S.41 (1953).
142. Id. at 43.
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informing function precedes his judicial career, 1 43 then declares
that ". . . the indispensable 'informing function of Congress' is not
144
to be minimized."'

But Wilson's statement, as quoted by Justice Frankfurter, need
not lead to the conclusion that there is an informing function independent of the legislative, since he was adverting only to investigations into the conduct of the executive branch, which is of course a
customary and proper subject for legislation. And all the Supreme
Court pronouncements on the rationale of the investigative power
argue against the existence of an informing function as a basis for
committee jurisdiction. For the Court has said that Congress
possesses investigative power only because it "is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied ;,,145 that the test of validity
is whether Congress has undertaken the investigation either "with
a view to possible exercise of its legislative function or possible
discharge of its duty to determine the validity of the election of its
members ; ' 140 that Congress has no general power to investigate,
but only the "auxiliary... limited power of inquiry... necessary
and appropriate to make the express powers effective." ' Recently
the Court went out of its way to emphasize in dictum that "the
power to investigate . . . [does not] extend to an area in which

Congress is forbidden to legislate. Similarly, the power to investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcem ent. .. ." ,148
Only by keeping the investigative power tied to the legislative
function, can it be kept the limited power prescribed by the Court.
And in appraising the dangers of a free-swinging "informing function," one must not be misled by the innocuous connotation of the
phrase. Obviously any congressional investigating committee in any
field does more than merely inform, or as Wilson put it, "....

report

what it sees ;"19 it inevitably propagandizes for a point of view,
starting with its very selection of subjects for investigation.
Even if some type of informing function should be recognized,
the court of appeals' view in Rumely that it could not justify inter143. See Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations, 38 New Republic,
May 21, 1924, p. 329.
144. Rumely v. United States, 345 U. S. 41, 43 (1953).
145. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.135, 161 (1927).
146. United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 573 (1937).
147. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 173 (1927); repeated in
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S.263, 291 (1929). See Jones and Ellis
cases, note 103 supra.
148. Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161 (1955) (court's footnote omitted).
149. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.41, 43 (1953).
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ference with first amendment rights, seems dearly right; and Justice
Frankfurter's declaration in the Supreme Court opinion that
Wilson "did not write... inthe context of the first amendment"'5 0
shows some approval of this view. Certainly, the right guaranteed to
the people, as against the Congress, to express themselves and inform each other, cannot be subordinated to a cbngressional power
of expression whose constitutional status is at best tenuous and
tangential.
Vahe of Committees' "Infonning" Public on Communisn
Whether the information given to the public by the investigations has had much significance in the decline of the Communist
Party seems dubious. Disillusionment with the party, according to
numerous ex-Communist witnesses, generally antedated the investigations, and none have indicated they were at all influenced by
the committee exposures."' More important, the committees can
hardly claim credit for the decline in the "front" organizations of
Popular Front days, which were an integral part and a concrete
embodiment of the Communists' efforts to irifluence public opinion.
These organizations, like the League against War and Fascism,
favoring various then-popular positions such as international collective security against Fascist countries, kept large memberships
only as long as they expressed views in agreement with those held
by a large section of the American public. When the Communists
adopted positions such as that lauding the Nazi-Soviet pact, to
which the public was inimical, they were n'o Pied Pipers except for
the inner core of 'the party; their popular-front organizations
withered."'2
150. Id. at 44.
151. See, e.g., testimony of Robert Gorham Davis, Daniel J. Boorstin,
and Granville Hicks, HearingsBefore the House Committee on Un-American
Activities, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 59, 107-08 (1953); Wechsler, Age of
Suspicion c. 6 (1953). Compare testimony of Mortimer Riemer, given before
the House Un-American Activities Committee on December 14, 1955, as to
his former membership in the Communist Party and activity in organizing the
National Lawyers Guild. He testified that he had resigned an executive
position in the Guild in 1939 or 1940, ". . . after having been charged at a
guild convention [in 1939] with using the organization for Communist Party
purposes and getting 'Moscow gold' ...... Mr. Riemer denied these accusations before the Committee. N. Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1955, p. 18, col 3. The
Comhittee seemed more interested in Mr. Riemer's protestations than the
Guild.had been.
152. See Hearing cited supra note 151 at 5, 11-12, 13, 57, 59, 65-66, 105,
106-07; Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 151. Compare Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 337-39, 351 (1952), respecting influence of
congressional investigation in the final collapse of the Southern Conference
for Human Welfare. As to the probative standards in the investigation of that
organization, see Gellhorn, Report on a Report of the House Un-Anerican
Activities Committee, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1947).
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To give the devil of this article its due, the atmosphere of fear
that the investigations help create no doubt help to hinder the Cornmunists from re-animating another round of "front" organizations.
For certainly the fear of non-conformist expression and association
makes it harder for Communists as well as non-Communists to
get people to express themselves on political issues except in ultranationalist terms. The discouragement of "front" organizations may
well be healthy for the body politic. But if this discouragement is accommplished by inhibiting free exchange of opinion generally, it
would seem a transient benefit at the cost of a far-reaching sacrifice.

